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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15674

-vsKELVIN TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with theft of a firearm
in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-404 (Supp. 1977),

a felony of the second degree, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412
{Supp. 1977).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the
l~norable J. Robert Bullock sentenced the defendant

to a term in the Utah State Prison of not less than one
nor

more than fifteen years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court
affirming the judgment rendered below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant and Mark Myers were runaways
from the "halfway house" prison facility (T.20).
The defendant, Mark Myers, and Myers' fiancee,
Holly, took an automobile, food, and some firearms
into the mountains to "hide out" from the police
(T.23-27).

Mark gave the defendant permission to

take his car to visit some girls if he promised to
return by 5:00 o'clock (T.l5-l6).

The defendant did

not return by 5:00 o'clock that evening, or by the
following morning, so Mark walked from the campsite
and found the defendant at a laundromat in Payson
(T.l6-17).

Mark discovered that a citizen's band

radio had been taken from the car (T.l7).

The

defendant told Mark that it had been stolen when he
was repairing a flat tire on the car (T .18).

Mark

later learned that a rifle had been taken from the
trunk of the car (T.l7).

The rifle was recovered from

the shop where defendant had pawned it, along with the
radio and other items taken from the car (T.l8-19,38-39,

-2-
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51-52).

The defendant admitted pawning the-rifle

without permission because he had no other means of.
obtaining .money (T.47,69).

The defendant testified

the money was needed to buy food (T.69-70).
Defendant's claimed error on appeal is
that evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs was
improperly admitted.

The facts surrounding this

claimed error are as follows:
After the prosecutor's opening .statement,
defendants moved for a mistrial on two grounds:

(1)

the prosecutor stated that the defendant had been in
the "halfway house" before the offense was committed,
implying he had been convicted of another crime, and

(2) the prosecutor stated that other items had been
taken from the car in addition to the rifle (T.7-8).
The court denied the motion for a mistrial.
Mark testified that he had first met the
defendant at the Utah State Prison, and defendant
objected "on the basis of my former motion."

(T.ll).

The court stated that defendant had a standing objection
and overruled the objection (T.ll).

The prosecutor then

asked Mark about certain girls, and Mark answered that
they were runaways (T.l2).
lhc answer.

Defendant moved to strike

Id.
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The Court answered:
"THE COURT: Well, perhaps
I could handle it this way, that
by instructing the Jury now that
the only question that is before
you for resolution is whether or
not on September 9, 1977 the
defendant Kelvin Taylor stole a
firearm. • • And any of the other
testimony is just strictly by way
of background, had no bearing upon
the question as to whether or not
Mr. Taylor d~d. But the Court
rules that it is necessary for
you to have an understanding of
how the situation developed so that
you can decide the ultimate question
as to whether or not Mr. Taylor did
as the state charges. And only for
that purpose do I permit these
questions, Mr. Carter."
(T.l2-13).
The defendant's counsel stated that he did not want to
interrupt again, and ask8d if he could have a
objection.

standi~

The court st0ted:
"THE COURT: Yes, you may,
absolutely. You have it. I'll
not permit him to go further than
to just give us all a picture as
to the actual situation, so that
the Jury can focus on the -- properly
focus on the ultimate question as to
whether or not the theft occurred."
(T.l3).

After this point in the trial, there were oo
further objections to questions or motions to strike
witnessPs' answers, but further testimony was given
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that tended to imply that defendant had committed
crimes.

Mark was asked about the events of a certain

day, and he replied that "the defendant went out and
siphoned gas for us."

(T.lS).

Evidence that the

defendant had stolen items other than the rifle
from Mark's car was received (T.l7-18).

Mark was

asked what he had done after finding the gun in the
pawn shop, and he answered that he called the police
and that the police had told him that they had
a warrant for the defendant's arrest for escape from
the halfway house (T.20).

On cross-examination, Mark

testified that he and the defendant had planned to
poach wild game (T.25).

Detective Sargeant Frank

Wall of the Utah County Sheriff's Department testified
as to certain conversations he had with the defendant.
The prosecutor asked Wall if he had inquired about the
rifle, and Wall answered:
"Yes: I asked him, I said,
'Kelvin, you realize that this
would violate you, being in
possession and doing this with
the firearm?' And he said, 'Yes.'
I asked him if his probation officer
had been notified, and he said, 'No.'
So at that time we called his probation officer and talked with him."
(T.48).
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Wall was then asked to relate another
conversation with the d2fendant, and he testified:
"We had talked about his being involved in the situ::~
tion, and I asked !1r. 'l'aylor why he would want to violate
his parole and ·take the chance again. • •

"

(T.49).

Finally, \\Tall related a conversation he had
with the defendant at the time of his arrest when the
defendctnt stated, "Well, I guess this will put me
back in prison."

(T.SO).

Wall testified that he "had

helped him (the defendant) out in previous (occasions?)
and I

felt that he hadn't been honest to me • • • • "

(T.S0-51).
At the close of the State's case, defendant
renewed his motion for a mistrial, and the court deni~
it (T.56-57).

The defendant took the stand in his own

behalf (T.63-76).
ARGUMENT
POIN'l' I
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
OF OTHER CRIHES.
A.

EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD STOLEN OTHER

ITEHS AT THE 'riHE AND PLACE OF THE THEFT CHJ\RGED IN THE
INFOR1'1ATICN WAS PROPERLY ADHI'l'TED BECAUSE IT WAS RELEVX;
TO ESTABLISH A COM1'10N PLAN OR SCHEt'lE.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Utah Rules of Evidence 55 provide that
evido0ce of other crimes is admissible when relevant
to prc,re a common plan or scheme.

State v. Schieving,

535 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1975); State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d
775 (Utah 1977).

Evidence that the defendant had

taken items other than the rifle from the car and
pawned them at the same shop is relevant to prove a
common plan or scheme to commit thefts of items from
Mark Myers' car in order to obtain money.

Respondent

submits that evidence of-the other thefts falls within
Rule 55, and the Cauble and Schieving cases, supra,
and was properly admitted by the court below.
B.
COl';\'Er~SP~.TION

THE DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION, AND THE
SURROUNDING DEFENDANT 1 S ADMISSION, WERE

PROPERLY ADMITTED.
Officer Wall's testimony that the defendant
stated in his presence, "Well, I guess this will put
me back in prison"

(T.30), was admissible hearsay

because it was an admission.
63(6).

Utah Rules of Evidence

The statement was also admissible, even though

it te~ded to show commission of another offense,
because it was relevant to prove guilty knmvledge.
Utah Rules of Evidence 55.
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"Statements admitting a crime by one not
under arrest are admissible.

The fact that he

admitted other crimes at the same time does not
render the statement inadmissible."

Lamberson v. State,

504 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. Crim. 1974).

The case of

\'looley v. People, 367 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1962), is in
point.

In Wooley, the court allowed the defendant's

entire confession into evidence even though it implied
that defendant had been in prison, because the
co~fession

was voluntary and in response to a proper

question.

In this case, defendant's admission, "1-vell,

I guess this will put me back in prison"

(T.30),

was spontaneous and voluntary.
Defendant's other admissions to Officer Nall
were also admissible, and because they were admissib~,
the jury was entitled to hear the conversational context
in which they occurred, even though Officer 1-vall' s
questions implied that defendant was a probationer or
parolee.

"It is settled law that where a conversat~n

is inquired into it is not error to elicit the entire
conversation even though, in this fashion, such conversa·
tion incidentally reveals the commir;sion of another offe·
People v. Howard, 334 P. 2d 105, 113 (Cal.l\pp. 1959) ·
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Respondent submits that defendant's admissions, and the
conversations in which they occurred, were relevant and
material to prove the offense charged, and the fact that
they implied that defendant had been convicted of other
crimes did not render them incompetent.
C.

EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD ESCAPED FROM

A PRISON FACILITY, AIDED RUNAWAYS, AND SIPHONED GASOLINE
WAS PROPERLY .ADMITTED TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SUH.ROUNDING THE! CRIME AND TO DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT'S
MOTIVE.
In State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 329, 495
P.?i 1265, 1267 (1972), this Court explained that
"relevant evidence is admissible for the purpose of
explaining the circumstances surrounding the crime of
which the defendant stands accused; and the fact that
it may tend to connect the defendant with another crime
will not render the evide;1ce incompetent."

In this case,

the defendant escaped from a prison facility, and
the flight to a mountain campsite, the theft of
gasoline, and the pawning of the stolen rifle to obtain
money for food were all connected because they related
to defendant's attempt to elude the authorities.

If

the jury had not heard evidence of defendant's escape,

-9-
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his actions would seen unconnected and inexplicable.
The court below ruled that "it is necessary for you
[the jury] to have an understanding of how the
situa·tion developed so that you can declde the ultimate
(T.l3).

question.

Respondent submits that this

ruling is correct because the seemingly unrelated other
offenses are, in reality, bound together by the single
transaction of defendant's attempt to escape and elude
capture.

This attempt to escape provided the motive

for defendant's theft:

the charge in issue.

Evidence

of other offenses relevant to prove motive are admissiblt.
Utah Rules of Evidence 55.

In a prosecution for theft

of a car, evidence of defendant's recent escape from the
county jail is admissible to prove motive and as part of I
the res gestae. Fleming v. State, 536 P.2d 986 (Okla.
1975).

Cn•l

Evidenc2 of theft of an automobile is admissilik •

in a prosecuti m for escape, State_v. Courville, 38/ P,2c
938

(Wash. 1973), and evidence thai a defendant wa~

arrested in a stolen car is admissible in a burgla~:·
prosecution.
App. 1968).

People v. Robinson, 240 N.E.2d 397 (Ill.
Admission of this type of evidence is

governed by the "complete story" test that allows t~
jury to hear all of the evidence surrounding an alleg~
offense, even if an0ther offense is incidC"ntally cstJbli'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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l.

State v. Allen, 111 Ariz. 546, 535 P.2d 3 (1975).
Respondent sub,'lits that the evidence submitted to the
jury was relevant to an explanation of the.circumstances
surrounding the offense and to the defendant's motive.
POlNT II
ASSUMING THAT EVIDENCE OF OTHER OFFENSES WAS
IHPROPERLY ADMITTED, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS AND DOES
NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL.
The evidence of defendant's guilt is overwhelming.
rifle

Defendant confessed that he had taken the

witho~t

permission to do so (T.47,69).

The

defendant was identified by the pawnbroker, and the
defendant's signature was on the pawn ticket (T.38,39).
The defendant offered a false explanation to Mark when
other thefts from the car were discovered (T.l8).

This

Court should not reverse unless the judgment below would
have been different but for the error.
§

77-42-1 (1953).

Utah Code Ann.

In view of the evidence, the judgment

and verdict could not have been otherwise.

The possibility

of prejudicP was substantially lessened by the judge's
cautionary instruction that evidence of other offenses
" • • • is just strictly by way of background, had no
b~3ring

upon the question as to whether or not Mr. Taylor
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did [commit the offense]"

(T.l2-13).

The possibility

of prejudice \vas further reduced by the fact that the
most damaging evidence relating to prior convictions
could have been brought out anyway \vhen the defendant
tJok the stand in his own behalf and was therefore
required to ans\ver previous felony convictions.

Utah

Code Ann. § 78-24-9

Utah~

343, 517 P.2d 1029

(1953); State v. Bennett, 30

(1973); and Utah Rules of Evidence

U

It would be particularly unjust to reverse the convictio,,
in this case where nearly all of the offensive evidence
\-Tas

introduced, not by an improper question, but because

i t was volunteered by an overzealous or non-responsive
witness.

Respondent submits that the evidence of guilt

is overwhelming and the prejudice from the claimed error,
if any, was slight.
CONCLUSION
Respo;tdent submits that evidence of other
offenseo; \-,as p:copcrly admitted to prove plan, motive or
guilty knowled<Je JJy

i'tn

adm_;_ssion.

If any error is found

in the admission of this evidence, respondent submits
that i t is harmless.

Acc·>rdingly, respondent asks this
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Court to affirm the judgment rendered below.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEAMER
Deputy Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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